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Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
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The diversity in wealth and social status is present not only among humans, but throughout the animal world.
We account for this observation by generating random variables that determine the social diversity of players
engaging in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Here the term social diversity is used to address extrinsic factors that
determine the mapping of game payoffs to individual fitness. These factors may increase or decrease the fitness
of a player depending on its location on the spatial grid. We consider different distributions of extrinsic factors
that determine the social diversity of players, and find that the power-law distribution enables the best promotion
of cooperation. The facilitation of the cooperative strategy relies mostly on the inhomogeneous social state of
players, resulting in the formation of cooperative clusters which are ruled by socially high-ranking players that
are able to prevail against the defectors even when there is a large temptation to defect. To confirm this, we
also study the impact of spatially correlated social diversity and find that cooperation deteriorates as the spatial
correlation length increases. Our results suggest that the distribution of wealth and social status might have
played a crucial role by the evolution of cooperation amongst egoistic individuals.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.40.Ca, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
The prisoner’s dilemma game, consisting of cooperation
and defection as the two competing strategies, is considered a
paradigm for studying the emergence of cooperation between
selfish individuals [1]. Since the game promises a defect-
ing individual the highest income if facing a cooperator the
prevalence of cooperation within this theoretical framework
presents a formidable challenge. Indeed, the classical well-
mixed prisoner’s dilemma game completely fails to sustain co-
operation [2], which is often at odds with reality where mutual
cooperation may also be the final outcome of the game [3].
A seminal theoretical mechanism for cooperation within the
prisoner’s dilemma game was introduced by Nowak and May
[4], who showed that the spatial structure and nearest neighbor
interactions enable cooperators to form clusters on the spatial
grid and so protect themselves against exploitation by defec-
tors. A decade later, this theoretical prediction has been con-
firmed by biological experiments [5]. Nonetheless, the some-
what fragile ability of the spatial structure to support coop-
eration [6], along with the difficulties associated with payoff
rankings in experimental and field work [7], has made it a
common starting point for further refinements of cooperation
facilitating mechanisms. In particular, the specific topology of
networks defining the interactions among players has recently
received substantial attention [8], and specifically scale-free
graphs [9] have been recognized as extremely potent promot-
ers of cooperative behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma as well
as the snowdrift game [10]. Although the promotion of co-
operation by the scale-free topology has been found robust
on several factors [11], the mechanism has recently been con-
tested via the introduction of normalized payoffs or so-called
participation costs [12]. Moreover, the interplay between the
evolution of cooperation as well as that of the interaction net-
work has also been studied [13], and it has been discovered
that intentional rewiring in accordance with the preference and
fitness of each individual as well as simple random rewiring
of the interaction network might both have a beneficial effect
on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma and
the snowdrift game. For a comprehensive review of this field
of research see [14].
Besides studies addressing network complexity as a some-
what direct extension of [4], several approaches have also
been proposed that warrant the promotion of cooperation
within nearest neighbor interactions. Examples include strate-
gic complexity [15], direct and indirect reciprocity [16],
asymmetry of learning and teaching activities [17], random
diffusion of agents on the grid [18], as well as fine-tuning of
noise and uncertainties by strategy adoption [19]. The im-
pact of asymmetric influence, introduced via a special player
with a finite density of directed random links to others, on
the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma game on small-world
networks has also been studied [20]. It is worth noting that
stochasticity in general, either being introduced directly or
emerging spontaneously due to finite population sizes [21],
has been found crucial by several aspects of various evolu-
tionary processes.
In this paper, we wish to extend the scope of stochastic ef-
fects on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s
dilemma game by introducing the social diversity of players
as their extrinsically determined property. This is realized by
introducing scaling factors that determine the mapping from
game payoffs to the fitness of each individual. The scaling
factors represent extrinsic differences amongst players, and as
such determine their social status and the overall social di-
versity on the spatial grid. Importantly, the scaling factors
are drawn randomly from different distributions and are deter-
mined only once at the beginning of the game. Positive scaling
factors increase the magnitude of payoffs a particular player
is able to exchange, while negative factors have the opposite
effect. It is important to note that the average of all scaling
factors is exactly zero, so that there is no net contribution of
social diversity to the total payoff of the population. Presently,
we consider scaling factors drawn from the uniform, expo-
2nential, and scale-free distribution, and thus distinguish three
different cases of social diversity. We investigate how the in-
troduction of social diversity, and in particular its distribution
and amplitude, affect the evolution of cooperation amongst
players on the spatial grid. We report below that the coopera-
tion is enhanced markedly as the amplitude of social diversity
increases, and moreover, that the biggest enhancement is ob-
tained if the social diversity follows a power-law distribution.
We attribute the enhancement of cooperation to the emergence
of cooperative clusters, which are controlled by high-ranking
players that are able to prevail against the defectors even if the
temptation to defect is large. Indeed, the role of these clusters
is similar to the role of pure cooperator neighborhoods around
hubs on scale-free networks [22], or to the part of imitating
followers surrounding master players in the enhanced teach-
ing activity model [17], as will be clarified later. To highlight
the importance of the strongly diverse social rank, we also
study the impact of spatially correlated social diversity, and
find that the facilitation of the cooperative strategy deterio-
rates as the correlation length increases. Thus, a finite spatial
correlation of social diversity hinders the formation of strong
cooperative clusters, in turn lending support to the validity of
the reported cooperation-facilitating mechanism in the spatial
prisoner’s dilemma game.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II is devoted to the description of the spatial prisoner’s
dilemma game and the properties of scaling factors determin-
ing social diversity of players on the spatial grid. In Section
III we present the results of numerical simulations, and in Sec-
tion IV we summarize the results and outline some biological
implications of our findings.
II. MODEL DEFINITION
We consider an evolutionary two-strategy prisoner’s
dilemma game with players located on vertices of a two-
dimensional square lattice of size L×L with periodic bound-
ary conditions. Each individual is allowed to interact only
with its four nearest neighbors, and self-interactions are ex-
cluded. A player located on the lattice site i can change its
strategy si after each full iteration cycle of the game. The
performance of player i is compared with that of a randomly
chosen neighbor j and the probability that its strategy changes
to sj is given by [23]
W (si ← sj) =
1
1 + exp[(Pi − Pj)/K]
, (1)
where K = 0.1 characterizes the uncertainty related to the
strategy adoption process, serving to avoid trapped conditions
and enabling smooth transitions towards stationary states. The
payoffs Pi and Pj of both players acquired during each itera-
tion cycle are calculated in accordance with the standard pris-
oner’s dilemma scheme [4], according to which the temptation
to defect T = b > 1, reward for mutual cooperation R = 1,
punishment for mutual defection P = 0, and the sucker’s pay-
off S = 0. Importantly, throughout this work the original
prisoner’s dilemma payoff ranking (T > R > P > S) is
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FIG. 1: Distributions of scaling factors (ξ) originating from the uni-
formly distributed random variable (χ). The three functions corre-
spond to uniform (u), exponential (e), and power-law (p) distribution
when a = 1. For easier comparison only the [−1, 1] interval of ξ is
plotted.
applicable since the introduction of social diversity via scal-
ing factors only acts as a mapping of the original payoffs to
individual fitness, as will be described next.
To introduce social diversity we use rescaled payoffs of the
form X ′ = X(1 + ξ), where X is either T , R, P or S,
ξ = min(ξi, ξj), and ξi is a scaling factor drawn randomly
from a given distribution for each participating player i only
once before the start of the simulation. Note that the minimum
of the two random scaling factors involved at every instance
of the game is used for payoffs of both involved players i and
j to ensure that the prisoner’s dilemma payoff ranking is pre-
served. It is worth mentioning that the maximum of both val-
ues would have had the same effect, but below presented re-
sults are virtually independent of this technicality, and more-
over, it seems reasonable to assume that the higher-ranking
player (the one with the larger value of ξ) will adjust to the
weaker one since the latter simply cannot match the stakes
of the game otherwise. Within this study we consider the uni-
form (also known as rectangular), exponential, and power-law
distributed social diversity defined by the following functions:
ξ = a (−2χ+ 1) (2)
ξ = a (− logχ− 1) (3)
ξ = a (χ−1/n −
n
n− 1
) where2 ≤ n ∈ N. (4)
Here χ are uniformly distributed random numbers from the
unit interval, and
∫ 1
0
ξ(χ)dχ = 0 in all cases, so that the av-
erage of ξ over all the players is zero. It is easy to see that
the largest difference between the exponential and power-law
function can be obtained if n = 2 in the latter, as shown in
Fig. 1. Henceforth we use n = 2 when the power-law distri-
bution is applied. The parameter a determines the amplitude
of undulation of the scaling factors, and hence the dispersion
of social diversity, and can occupy any value from the unit
interval. In particular, a = 0 returns the original payoffs,
whereas a = 1 is the maximally allowed value that still pre-
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FIG. 2: Spatial distributions of social diversity obtained for a =
1 when uniform (u), exponential (e), and power-law (p) distributed
values of scaling factors were used. Lines show an exemplary cross-
section of the two-dimensional grid.
serves (1 + ξi) ≥ 0 for all i, thus preventing possible vio-
lations of the prisoner’s dilemma payoff ranking. Note that
(1 + ξi) < 0 could induce R > T , which would directly vi-
olate the rules of the prisoner’s dilemma game. The spatial
distributions of the three considered cases obtained by a = 1
are demonstrated in Fig. 2 where cross-sections with linear
system size L = 300 are plotted. Clearly, the uniform dis-
tribution provides the gentlest dispersion of social diversity,
whereas the largest segregation of players is warranted by the
power-law distributed scaling factors where some values are
very high at the expense of extended regions of very small
ξ resulting in these players having much smaller payoffs as
compared to the non-scaled case. The exponential distribu-
tion of scaling factors yields a dispersion of social diversity
that is between the uniform and the power-law case, as can be
inferred from Fig. 2, as well as indirectly also from Fig. 1.
In order to explain the main features of the reported re-
sults, we also use spatially correlated social diversity so that
the scaling factors ξi satisfy the correlation function 〈ξiξj〉 ∝
exp(| i − j | /λ), where λ is the spatial correlation length.
In this case we constrain our study to the case where ξi are
drawn from a uniform distribution within the interval [−1, 1].
An efficient algorithm for the generation of spatially corre-
lated random numbers with a prescribed correlation length is
given in [24]. The effect of different values of λ on the scaling
factors determining social diversity is demonstrated in Fig. 3.
Clearly, the random undulations become more and more cor-
related across neighbors on the spatial grid as λ increases.
Before the start of each game simulation, both strategies
populate the spatial grid uniformly and the scaling factors are
drawn randomly from a given distribution to determine the so-
cial diversity of participating players. After these initial con-
ditions are set, the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game is iterated
forward in time using a synchronous update scheme, thus let-
ting all individuals interact pairwise with their four nearest
neighbors. After every iteration cycle of the game, all play-
ers simultaneously update their strategy according to Eq. 1.
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FIG. 3: Spatial distributions of social diversity constituted by ran-
domly drawn scaling factors from a uniform distribution by a = 1
and spatial correlation length λ = 1 (bottom), λ = 3 (middle), and
λ = 7 (top). Lines show an exemplary cross-section of the two-
dimensional grid.
To avoid finite-size effects, the simulations were carried out
for a population of 300 × 300 players, and the equilibrium
frequencies of cooperators were obtained by averaging over
104 iterations after a transient of 105 iteration cycles of the
game. The figures showing values of cooperator densities on
the spatial grid (FC ) resulted from an average over 30 simula-
tions with different realizations of social diversity as specified
by the appropriate parameters. These simulation parameters
yield at least ±3 % accurate values of FC in all figures.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Next, we study how different distributions of social diver-
sity affect the evolution of cooperation via numerical simula-
tions of the above-described spatial prisoner’s dilemma game.
Figure 4 features color-coded FC for all three types of social
diversity in the relevant b− a parameter space. Evidently, re-
gardless of the distribution, increasing values of a clearly pro-
mote cooperation as the threshold of cooperation extinction
increases from b = 1.01 in the absence of social diversity to
b = 1.20 (uniformly distributed social diversity), b = 1.28
(exponentially distributed social diversity), and b = 1.34
(power-law distributed social diversity). Moreover, there al-
ways exists a broad range in the parameter space within which
cooperators rule completely; a non-existent feature if a = 0.
We argue that the above-reported facilitation of coopera-
tion is due to the induced inhomogeneous social state of play-
ers that fosters cooperative clusters around players with the
largest values of ξi. Indeed, as soon as cooperators overtake
these prime spots of the grid they start to spread due to their
cluster-forming nature. Note that the latter feature is not asso-
ciated with defectors who therefore fail to take the same ad-
vantage out of social diversity, and are thus defeated. A simi-
lar behavior underlies also the cooperation-facilitating mech-
anism reported for the scale-free networks, where the players
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FIG. 4: Color-coded FC for the uniform (left), exponential (middle), and power-law (right) distributed social diversity on the b− a parameter
space. The color scale is linear, white depicting 0.0 and black 1.0 values of FC .
with the largest connectivity dominate the game. Since coop-
erators are much better equipped for permanently sustaining
the occupation of hubs, the scale-free networks provide a uni-
fying framework for the evolution of cooperation [10]. An
even better similarity can be established with the model in-
corporating the inhomogeneous teaching activity [17]. In the
latter, some players are blocked and therefore unable to do-
nate their strategies, which results in homogeneous coopera-
tive domains around players with full teaching capabilities. In
the presently studied model, the introduction of social diver-
sity partly results in a similar suppression of selected players,
especially so for the power-law distributed case where the ma-
jority of players are low-ranking, as demonstrated in Fig. 1.
These players can form an obedient domain around a high-
ranking player and so prevail against defectors. On the other
hand, a high-ranking defector will be weakened by the low-
ranking players who follow its destructive strategy.
The above-described feedback works only if the high-
ranking defectors can be linked solely by their follower neigh-
borhoods; namely there must not be a strong connection with
other high-ranking players. In the opposite case, the hetero-
geneous strategy distribution supports the survival of defec-
tors. To support our explanation, we study the impact of spa-
tially correlated social diversity on the evolution of coopera-
tion. According to our argument, the transition from uncorre-
lated to spatially correlated diversity should be marked with
the deterioration of cooperation. We thus introduce spatially
correlated social diversity as described in Section II, and study
the effect of different λ on the evolution of cooperation. Fig-
ure 5 features the results. In agreement with our conjecture,
the facilitation of cooperation deteriorates fast as λ increases.
Indeed, a near linear decrease of the critical b marking the
extinction of cooperators can be established, and moreover,
by large λ the cooperators can outperform defectors only for
slightly higher values of b than in the absence of social diver-
sity (a = 0). This result supports the validity of the reported
cooperation-facilitating mechanism, and hopefully paves the
way for additional studies incorporating social diversity into
the theoretical framework of evolutionary game theory.
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FIG. 5: FC as a function of b for different values of λ. The a = 0
curve is depicted for reference.
IV. SUMMARY
In this paper, we show that social diversity is an efficient
promoter of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma
game. The facilitative effect increases with the dispersion of
social diversity and deteriorates with the increase of its spa-
tial correlation. Accordingly, spatially uncorrelated power-
law distributed social diversity provides the biggest boost to
the cooperative strategy. We argue that the facilitative effect
is conceptually similar to the one reported previously for in-
homogeneous teaching activities, and also has the same root
as the mechanism applicable by scale-free networks, namely:
akin to hubs or players with enhanced teaching activity, in
this model, high-ranking players can form robust cooperative
clusters with low-ranking obedient neighbors. The presented
results suggest that the distribution of wealth plays a crucial
role by the evolution of cooperation amongst egoistic individ-
uals, and it seems reasonable to investigate further whether a
co-evolution of both might yield new insights and foster the
understanding of the formation of complex societies.
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